The Ōsaka Dragon.
Author: Tomás Vera Ziccardi.
Triumphant
or defeated? With political expectations or a finished carrier? Popular or
hated by society? These and many more questions surround one of the most
dynamic political figures that the rigid Japanese system has known in recent years. For many Japanese voters Hashimoto Tōru represents a new generation of
politicians. Non identified or linked with the traditional Japanese elite that
has commanded national politics, critic of Tōkyō’s bureaucracy and proclaimed
as one of the potential leaders that could confront Kantō’s power, Mr. Hashimoto has
awakened since the very beginning the support of a relevant sector of Japanese
citizenship. Despite this, not only the academic and the political – economic
elites from Tokyo have shown resistance to his proposals, he has also obtained
opposition from voters of large urban conglomerates. Of course most of this is
linked to the increasing media exposure that the current Ōsaka Major has had,
especially after his statement regarding ‘comfort women’ and Japan’s Imperial
past. Despite the dyad in which Mr. Hashimoto has settled himself, his political
figure has expanded to a national scale. What will the future hold for this
young politician? Unfortunately we do not have the answer to this question, but
it is clear that in order to understand his future we need to address his
personal life, political career and the stellar evolution that allowed him to go
from a prefectural political figure to a nationwide one.
Despite he
was born in Tōkyō (where he spent his early years), Mr. Hashimoto soon
abandoned the Kantō region, due to family reasons, and settled himself in
Kansai. His family background is extremely complex. Hashimoto had to go through
economic and personal difficulties during his youth. Despite it he did not
faltered in his personal goal of becoming a lawyer. For this purpose, once
completed elementary school he returned to Kantō in order to enter Law School
at Waseda University. After some attempts Hashimoto managed to enter one of the
most prestigious universities in Japan, where he would graduate at age 25. Firstly
there is something that should be clear, Hashimoto did not show immediate
interest in politics during his days as a college student. Unlike thousands of
Japanese freshmen that enter top universities in Tōkyō with the desire of
becoming relevant political figures, Hashimoto ended up being a distant
prototype to the Japanese student interested in politics. On the other hand, it
should be clear that Hashimoto’s background was not the one from a wealthy
Japanese family, hence Tōru shall not be confused with a member of the
traditional Japanese elite, something that clearly differentiates him from
other Japanese politicians.
After
completing his studies Hashimoto began to develop his career as a lawyer.
During these years he managed to progress, especially within the firm he
founded. His professional performance mainly covered the area of corporate law.
Hashimoto Tōru is one of the most interesting Japanese political figures. His arrival to national politics differs from the traditional way, something that made especialists categorize him as an 'outsider'.
Despite
what was previously exposed, Hashimoto Tōru began to relate himself with the
world of television entertainment. His corporate connections allowed him to
perform breaf appearances on television, mostly expressing himself about legal
issues. Over the years Mr. Hashimoto was able to increase his popularity, becoming
part of popular programs where he did not only speak about law and respond to
inquiries from the audience, now Hashimoto began expressing political ideas.
Possibly the main characteristic Hashimoto exposed during his years on TV was
the simplicity with which he responded to political issues. In a society where
the political establishment tends to scarcely debate and offer few answers to
the people’s inquiries, the voice of a young critic aroused relevant levels of
affection from the audience. This allowed Hashimoto to expand his popularity
even farther, becoming an important personality for civil society. It would be
precisely during these years when the possibility of a direct involvement in
politics began to take shape. Even more, several political parties thought
about the possibility of capitalizing Hashimoto’s popularity. Despite rumors
Hashimoto continued his link with local media. Finishing with the approach
developed so far, we can evidence that Hashimoto Tōru increased his popularity
nationwide, while retaining his legal performance. One of the main achievements of Ōsaka's future Major would be the one of combining both
worlds, creating a quick response for various sectors of Japanese society.
His image
gave him the opportunity of becoming an important social actor. His popularity
continued growing, especially in the Ōsaka City. During 2006 and 2007 Hashimoto
increased his speech related to social and political issues, becoming severely
critical of the way things were administered in Ōsaka Prefecture.
At first Mr.
Hashimoto denied rumors regarding his interest of becoming candidate for the Ōsaka
governance. We should take into account that back at that time Hashimoto lacked
experience as a public service official. He had never served at any level of
the Japanese public service. While the establishment reinforced its critics
regarding this issue, civil society seemed not to care about it. Meanwhile we
should understand that Ōsaka elections were a watershed moment for one of
Japan’s most important prefectures. Ōta Fusae, bureaucrat with an unimpeachable
experience as public service officer, had governed Ōsaka for 8 years. After
being re-elected for a second term, a political change was clearly visible.
Hashimoto acknowledged the opportunity, at the same time he started to receive
support from Jimintō and Kōmeitō. It is clear that in order to land at such an
important political position, being a popular figure was not enough, Tōru would
need support from Japan’s biggest political machinery.
After weeks
of speculation and even when Mrs. Ōta had announced her departure from the
prefectural executive, Mr. Hashimoto, with just a few months of time before the
election, announced his candidacy. The political victory gave Hashimoto more
than 51% of votes, becoming by early 2008 the Governor of Ōsaka Prefecture. His
victory was celebrated by locals and certain political structures, it was local
bureaucracy which showed a massive rejection of the new Governor. This might
have been linked to Hashimoto’s statements which announced huge cuts in public
spending and the number of administrative personnel. As we can appreciate, the
relationship between the young political leader and bureaucracy opened a new
chapter that would end up conditioning both parties.
Ōsaka is one of Japan’s most important political and financial centers of power. In 2008 Hashimoto won the election for Governor of Ōsaka Prefecture.
During his first
years as Governor, Tōru decided to tackle one of Ōsaka’s main issues, its debt.
The prefecture had one of Japan’s highest debts. Hashimoto began with a series
of measures focused on reducing both debt and public spending. This led to
direct confrontation with concentrated groups of power, especially those of the
banking sector and public administration. Here we evidence one of the tools
that Mr. Hashimoto will use throughout his political career, resorting to media
exposure in order to obtain people’s support and thus being able to confront
these powerful sectors that opposed his reforms. Hashimoto managed to
counter political inexperience with his media popularity.
Perhaps we
should stop at a relevant issue. The radical position Hashimoto showed from a
very beginning did nothing else that increase his popularity. In a nation
where a vast majority of the politicians are linked to corporations and the economic power, a figure like Hashimoto, who
not only fought them if not also exposed his fight to people, ended up
positioning him as someone different. Hashimoto’s popularity during his first
two years of government reached figures close to 70% and 80%.
Undoubtedly
Hashimoto strengthened his power, increased his popularity and managed to
advance in his reforms. Possibly, one of the most important stages of his
government was reached in 2010, when along with other relevant Ōsaka figures
founded his political party Ōsaka Ishin no Kai, known in the West under the
name of Ōsaka Restoration Association / Party. We clearly evidence Mr.
Hashimoto’s institutionalization of the power achieved during the past years.
Now it would no longer be necessary to request support from the major political
parties, Tōru counted with his own political platform which would allow him to
control Ōsaka. This is complemented with the interest Hashimoto exposed
from the very beginning of unifying Ōsaka Prefecture with certain areas of Ōsaka
City, in order to create a metropolitan area in Ōsaka, similar to the one in Tōkyō.
This plan is extremely interesting, it introduces innovative issues and
possible political & administrative changes for the Kansai Region, however
it should also be considered that it hides Hashimoto’s personal interest of strengthening
his power in Kansai, while consolidating his party and allies. Tōru made it
clear by the end of 2011, when he resigned as Governor in order to compete for
the elections of Ōsaka City. Tōru would not simply leave the prefectural
government, Matsui Ichirō, who in 2010 was appointed as Secretary General of Ōsaka
Ishin no Kai, would run for the governorship. As we can see Hashimoto
placed one of his main political allies as candidate for Ōsaka prefectural
government and ran as candidate for Ōsaka Major. As expected, both Hashimoto
and Matsui were victorious, enabling Ōsaka Restoration Party to control Ōsaka
City and Ōsaka Prefecture.
As incumbent Ōsaka Governor Mr. Hashimoto introduced reforms focused on tackling the Prefecture’s debt. His confrontative attitude gave him the support of a vast majority of citizens, something that explains early popularity levels.
At this
point Hashimoto’s plan marched as previously stipulated. He now controlled the
two most important centers of power at the local level. On the other hand he
counted with a political party which desired to expand nationwide. As for the
elections, Ōsaka Ishin no Kai reached a simple majority in the prefectural
assembly, despite over time it would be difficult to retain seats in the city
assembly where the party would suffer several setbacks and desertions.
Despite this situation, electoral results during the first years were extremely
favorable to Hashimoto and his party.
The year
2012 was one of major political changes in Japan. The political forces
restructuration after Minshutō’s inevitable departure from government made it
clear that a new opportunity loomed on the horizon for many parties and
political leaders. Clearly, Hashimoto Tōru had already made the passage to
national scene, his popularity had surpassed Osaka’s frontiers. The difference
was that he now needed not only to begin with the allies recruiting but also to
constitute a nationwide party. This is how during 2012 he founded Nippon Ishin no
Kai, the national extension of Ōsaka’s ruling party. His interest in expanding
his influence to Tōkyō was clearly represented in this political move.
Hashimoto not only counted with an enormous popularity due to his past, now he
had experience in management while he also showed toughness to carry out the
policies he believed were the best at that time. Furthermore Hashimoto
represented a new generation of young politicians, distant (to some extent) to the traditional Japanese political elite. This young Japanese leader also
represented a change in the centers of political power. A figure from Ōsaka
reached national popularity, challenging Tōkyō’s establishment. For many
Japanese voters Hashimoto was an important change in political terms, possibly
one of those that had ever taken place before.
Hashimoto
clearly awakened interest from various political sectors. After being elected
as Ōsaka Mayor he conducted meetings with various political forces and party
leaders from Tōkyō. Initially people linked him with Jimintō, Your Party and
even Kōmeitō. His connections with other relevant leaders such as Abe, Watanabe
and Ishihara proved that Hashimoto was prepared to interact at the highest
level of Japanese politics. Despite his growing popularity, misunderstandings were about to interfere
between Hashimoto and prominent political figures. As Nippon Ishin no Kai
gained strength at the national level, Hashimoto’s position took distance from
the one of moderate sectors among Jimintō and Minshutō. Tōru himself began to
focus on his plan of creating and Ōsaka Metropolitan Area. The idea was highly
innovative, it desired to develop a system similar to the one of Tōkyō-to, but
applied to the Kansai region. This project was ideologically linked to
Hashimoto’s personal ideas, those of independence, autonomy and
self-sufficiency. For others, Hashimoto’s plan hid a political framework with a
view to alienate Ōsaka from national administration. Cutting ties with Tōkyō
and establishing itself as an autonomous center of power was what many analysts
perceived from this plan. Several scholars went further and mentioned that
Hashimoto’s idea was to create an ‘independent enclave in Kansai’ and the
‘Republic of Kansai’, from which he would base a national platform in order to
become in the future the Prime Minister of Japan. As you might appreciate,
political positions were extremely divergent. The plan itself consisted of
unifying certain sectors of the Ōsaka Prefecture, Ōsaka City and the
Municipality of Sakai, in order to establish an independent metropolitan
region, similar to that of Tōkyō. Initially the
plan was to establish between 10 and 15 special wards like those of Chiyoda-ku,
Minato-ku and Taitō-ku in Tōkyō. Let’s recall that both governments were now under control of the same political party. In Sakai, Nippon Ishin no Kai won a
majority in the municipal assembly. This made it evident that the possibilities of
achieving the project were factual. Lastly, it is important to explain that
despite having elections in each ward the responsibility for security,
economic, employment and public service issues would be shared between the
local authorities and the metropolitan government.
During his exercise of power Hashimoto Tōru had to battle concentrated groups of power, among which were the financial and banking sectors.
As
previously mentioned, the Ōsaka Metropolis project affected and altered the
relation between Hashimoto and major political parties at local and national
levels. Several political forces opposed to the metropolitan plan arguing that
it would allow Hashimoto’s party to triumph indefinitely in future elections.
Most of these parties feared that Nippon Ishin no Kai would establish in Ōsaka
and autonomous centre of power, impossible to electorally defeat. Local
leaders, by observing the election results at the prefectural, city and
municipal (including Sakai) levels, understood that it would be difficult to
fight against Hashimoto’s project, while on the other hand cooperation would
mean breaking the guidelines with their party headquarters in Tōkyō.
Despite the
opposing positions on the political scene, main criticism to Tōru’s plan
emerged from the press. This would continue delimiting the fissure between
Hashimoto and the press.
The alliance between Hashimoto and Ishihara focuses on expanding the political platform of Ōsaka Ishin no Kai by linking Tōkyo and Ōsaka. The party leaders have been their respective governors.
Prior to
the Ōsaka City elections, when rumors regarding Hashimoto’s early resignation
began to emerge, Japan Daily Press published an article where focusing on the
Ōsaka Governor’s metropolitan plan argued that Hashimoto would resign and run
as a candidate for the upcoming city elections, overcoming the final obstacles
for achieving his project. National press, specially that one focused on
international readers, including Japan Daily Press, Japan Times and The Asahi
Shimbun (including Asia and Japan Watch) always had a troubled relation with Hashimoto. In fact it was due to media that criticism gained national force, in a sense warning Japanese
citizens that it was all part of a Machiavellian plan that would allow
Hashimoto to perpetuate himself and his party in government. After the victory
in Ōsaka City, last March, the media sought to reinforce the idea that less
that 30% of the electorate actually took part in the elections, challenging the
insistence with which Hashimoto sought to increase his influence in the
legislature in order to push forward his metropolitan plan. Of course, the
relationship further deteriorated when Hashimoto made inopportune declarations
regarding ‘Comfort Women’, which marked the formal war declaration between
Hashimoto and the most liberal sector of Japanese press. As The Japan Times
stated in an article published last February and titled Final Season for Toru
Hashimoto Show?, Hashimoto’s plan for unifying the city and prefecture in
order to create a metropolitan area had little support in the respective
assemblies, hence the resignation tactic was something that not even his
supporters understood (especially when Hashimoto should have stayed in his
position until 2015). As for the press, Hashimoto’s insistence on having the
plan finished and approved by April 2014, proved the impossibility of carrying
it out by his own. In a sense this is due to the forces positioning inside the
assemblies configuration, which must approve the project before a referendum is
called, but it should also be taken into consideration that the project had the
deliberation of consolidating an independent bureaucracy in Ōsaka, reducing
political and administrative opposition in the Prefecture and City of Ōsaka.
The article goes even further, stating that Hashimoto’s idea is the
one of establishing and independent and autonomous ‘Republic of Kansai’.
In order to expand nationwide Hashimoto created Nippon Ishin no Kai, the extension of Ōsaka’s platform. His political movements approached him to former Tōkyō Governor Mr. Ishihara Shintaro. In the image you can appreciate both leaders during a campaign event.
Possibly
most of the accusations made from the press were valid, however for the last
elections in Ōsaka other factors were relevant. For instance we must take into
account Kōmeitō’s position, which back then was Hashimoto’s major local ally.
Their representatives opposed to the project, generating even more opposition
in the local assembly. For Hashimoto this was a huge setback. His personal
project counted with the opposition from national media, left wing sectors,
civil society organizations and major political parties. On the other hand,
Matsui, also linked with Jimintō and Tōkyō politicians, sought to minimize the
so called ‘Komeitō Effect’. In order to achieve his goal Hashimoto must have
electoral success and support from the citizenship. For us an extra element is
also important, Tōru must have Tokyo’s approval, specially an unconditional
support from the bureaucrats and the national government.
We should
take into account electoral results. In the last general election to the Lower
House of Kokkai, Nippon Ishin no Kai obtained 54 seats, making it the third
political force in the House of Representatives. Let’s consider that its
performance was close to Minshutō’s one (57 seats) and surpassed Komeitō’s one,
a party which usually gets close to 31 seats. This shows that Nippon Ishin no
Kai managed to establish itself in the Japanese Diet, nevertheless if it
desires to increase its popularity it should expand at a national scale (especially
in the vast majority of prefectures). Its main political figures, Ishihara
Shintaro and Hashimoto Tōru, are not enough in order to win a national election
on their own. The party lacks from an expanded and nationwide consolidated
structure like the one for instance Jimintō has. Even for political parties that reached
national government such as Minshutō it has been extremely difficult to retain
local allies in different cities and prefectures, hence Hashimoto should
reconsider his strategy of unifying the city and prefecture until he manages to
obtain political and bureaucratic support. The creation of the institute for
young leaders proves that Tōru wills to consolidate his power in Kansai, many
youths who have been exponents of the electoral support Ōsaka’s Major obtained wish to be part of this ‘new bureaucracy’ that is intended to control the
future Ōsaka Metropolitan Area. In order to achieve these objectives Hashimoto
must have the political, economic, financial and media support from the sectors with
which he has had a fruitful relation. It would have been feasible to achieve
the completion of his plan by this year if Mr. Hashimoto had spent time working
from the shadows and distant from the enormous public exposure he lately had.
Accurately as The Japan Times titled, the ‘Hashimoto Show’ worked against Tōru,
despite being an expert as to media exposure and debate. Tōru has failed to
understand that in Japan the work ‘from behind’ facilitates the achievement of personal
goals, instead he decided to apply radical reforms by entering a media clash
against consolidated groups of power. On television that gave him results, in
national politics new strategies should be adopted, that has been Hashimoto’s
greatest failure: believing he could go against the system by using tools the
own system created. Tōru did not notice that cooperation, negotiation and
‘backdoors’ arrangements are better strategies in order to fulfill his
political desires. This is where it becomes clear that Hashimoto Tōru is not
the future successor of an historical political figure such as Ozawa Ichirō. In
recent years many political analysts claimed that Mr. Hashimoto was 'Japan’s New Shōgun', who would occupy the spot left by ‘Shadow Shōgun’. However this
is not going to happen. On the first place Ozawa raised as a political figure
from the core of the political system, emerging from Jimintō and establishing himself as a relevant member of the Tanaka Faction. He knows the mechanisms by which a
figure can obtain political advantages, in fact being able to operate in the
backdoors of politics rather that applying for public confrontation allowed him
to gain support for his initiatives at the same time it gave him the
appellation of Shadow Shogun. Hashimoto never understood this, not only for
being an outsider but also because he keeps applying tactics in a world that
works under a different logic from TV. We could never proclaim Hashimoto as a
Shōgun, because he lacks the ability to negotiate with rivals and enemies. Tōru
believes that the only way by which one can succeed is through a state of
constant war. A wise Shōgun was the one able to settle down and negotiate,
instead Hashimoto believes that the way in which he will obtain his objectives
is by relying on his own power and not opening the channel for dialogue. This
does not work in a nation like Japan. Kansai’s leader is far from emulating the
feudal lords that once ruled Japan, but he is even farther from surpassing ‘The Last Shōgun of Japan’, Mr. Ozawa. Hashimoto’s combative stance reminds us of a
dragon, which believes that fighting alone against everyone else is the only
way. Hashimoto is a dragon who thinks that by strengthening his nest in Ōsaka
he would be able to confront Tōkyō’s power. Unfortunately for him, Hashimoto
did not understand that in Japan you cannot fight independently against the
establishment.
Bureaucracy and media have been among Hashimoto’s major opponents. His level of cooperation with them was almost non-existent.
Over the
past years The Economist has paid enormous attention to the political and
economic situation in Japan. The prestigious British media has addressed in a
coherent way the vast majority of political changes that took part in Japan
since the Koizumi years onwards. Hence it is interesting to pay attention to
one of its most recent publications titled ‘Flaming out: the decline of Toru
Hashimoto’. In this work Hashimoto is introduced as a right-wing leader with a
conservative vision of some mainstream issues while in others he has introduced
innovative proposals. For The Economist, the electoral analysis based on what were
the elections for Ōsaka City (eventually won by Hashimoto) yielded a secured
victory for the former Ōsaka Governor. In fact their approach focused on
pointing out the lack of serious opposition leaders able to counter the growing image of young Hashimoto. However, for us it is relevant the ideas exposed by The
Economist regarding Hashimoto’s Metropolitan plan. According to the British
newspapers Hashimoto faces three serious problems in order to achieve his
master plan. Firstly the political, media and electoral setbacks that his
figured suffered, impacted negatively on the project. This is effectively true,
if Hashimoto had maintained a moderate profile during national elections and at
the same time avoided entering ideological and historical cleavages he would
have not only improved Nippon Ishin no Kai’s electoral performance but also
obtained the local and national support for his project. On the second place,
Hashimoto’s second major drawback, according to The Economist, was that he
never designed a strategy in order to introduce it to civil society,
specifically to the citizens of Sakai & Ōsaka city and prefecture. Several
Kansai citizens repeatedly asked themselves ‘what benefits does this plan bring
for us?’ Beyond Hashimoto’s justification of reducing public spending,
bureaucratic centralization and improvements in decision making, the
metropolitan project does not position citizens as the main priority, hence it
literally ended up looking as a personal plan of Mr. Hashimoto. Over time many
have been the members of society that began opposing to Hashimoto’s plan,
precisely because he failed in this issue, providing benefits to the
citizenship. Finally, the third pillar the prevents the reform is local
opposition. After the election that benefited Sakai’s Major (key town for
Nippon Ishin no Kai’s project), Takeyama Osami, local resistance from the
political apparatus increased. The possibilities of negotiation with Hashimoto
became remote, now local leaders think it should be Tōru who approaches them in
order to initiate negotiations.
Finally the
article, as its heading points out, suggests a possible scenario/panorama for
Hashimoto Tōru, the end of his political career, his disappearance from the
national arena. Part of this, The Economist explains, is because the Shinzō Abe
Administration ended up hogging Hashimoto’s ideological spectrum. This added to
the political and discursive mistakes impacted on the vision that society has
of him. In addition to this factors a third one is added, which is the project
for the metropolitan area. If Hashimoto fails to achieve his plan, as The
Economist argues, he would destroy his major aspiration, ending up in
a locked position with no way out. This approach is extremely interesting,
although it may be refuted. Hashimoto did not center his political career on
Ōsaka’s Metropolitan Project, he sought to expand his influence to other
regions, represented on the alliance with conservative politician Ishihara
Shintaro. Tōru also moved a step forward by becoming a national figure. Yes, it
is true that the shift to the right (partly generated by the society and partly
by the current ruling party) is notorious and that Hashimoto risks losing
political ‘capital’, but he still counts with a key centre of power such as
Ōsaka. It is hard to imagine Ōsaka without Tōru, as in accordance with The
Economist, there are no major political figures that can overtake him. So far
if there is something irrefutable is what The Economist points out: Hashimoto’s
public exposure and statements could definitely push him to a forced exile from
politics. However this deserves a separate review.
One of Hashimoto’s main projects has been the creation of the so called Ōsaka Metropolitan Area. This innovative proposal has both supporters and detractors.
In recent
years Japanese society has experienced an increase in the ideological cleavage
linked to nationalist, historical and political issues. This has not been
expressed in higher levels of social conflict, but rather a revival of
extremist positions, many of which are linked to Japan’s historical legacy.
This is how, for example, the famous ‘Hate Speech’ overstocked national scene,
when different sectors of Japanese society (from right-wing groups to ordinary
citizens) took over Tōkyō streets in order to protests against Korean
immigrants, more precisely in Shin Ōkubo. Moreover, from the political power
there has been an increase in the degree of interference in historical issues.
What political analysts expressed some years ago, Japan’s shift to the right,
appears to start taking shape. Part of the changes in power also expressed
themselves in the emergence of new right-wing leaders, among which we could
include Mr. Hashimoto. As we saw at the beginning of the work, Tōru has always
been a controversial leader who has repeatedly expressed positions that address
issues of Japan’s recent history. It was precisely during 2013 that he stated
‘comfort women’ were necessary. Despite some months before that, declarations from the political establishment towards the relation with China
and Korea increased their complexity, Hashimoto’s words surprised everyone, not
only because of their proximity to elections but also because this time
Hashimoto got involved in an extremely complex issue that transcends the
position of any political leader. Rapidly both, sectors of the Japanese and
Korean society expressed rejection towards the words of Ōsaka’s leader. Japanese
politicians themselves opposed to Hashimoto’s words, and those who did not do
so decided to remain silent in order of not getting involved in what might be
one of the greatest political gaffs of Japan’s recent political history.
Despite this, it was the press who attacked more fiercely, especially its more
liberal wing. Not only Japanese media, the foreign one exposed the leader’s
words and the opposition erected against him. Hashimoto quickly increased his
national presence, unfortunately not the way he expected. Tōru had to
repeatedly express himself regarding his previous statement, his contradictory
declarations made it look like if every time he spoke things got worse. Hashimoto ended up seeing how the world from which he eventually
was part (the media) turned against him. Tōru faced
most of his historical enemies, now allied to main media accredited in Tōkyō.
Hashimoto ended up seeking for a way out that would do little in order to amend
his mistake, when he visited the prestigious Foreign Correspondents' Club of
Japan in what was a full session of about two hours trying to explain his words
rather than apologizing. Instead of clarifying he constantly shifted the focus
of attention by evading key questions and trying to get as far away from his
previous statements. Briefly, Hashimoto, a prominent politician who had
everything ahead, with a few weeks for elections to Kokkai, destroyed most of
his political capital by making statements on a controversial issue. Of course
everyone knew from the very beginning that Tōru would not retract his words,
having the possibility in front of the media that day at the FCCJ he did not do
it, missing the opportunity and worsening the view that much of the society had
of him.
Party event of Nippon Ishin no Kai at its headquarters in Ōsaka after the positive national election of 2012.
The
emergence of Hashimoto Tōru in Japan’s political life meant a notorious change
that rose enthusiasm among many sectors of Japanese society. Despite being an
outsider Hashimoto counted with social support, his proposals, framed in an
agenda of structural reforms not only of public policy but also in the way of
making politics, delighted a vast majority of Ōsaka’s electorate. Since his
early appearances on TV he introduced a radical view of how things should work, over the years he secured a place in a
complex environment like the one of Japanese media. Despite not counting with
the family background, the specific formation and the contacts that members of
the political – economic establishment generally have, Hashimoto landed in the
arena of politics throughout television. Despite being an exception rather
than the rule, Tōru managed to position himself as a different candidate. In
this way he challenged the entire Japanese elite when he became Ōsaka
Governor. His policies once in power certified his promises and ideological
line. Hashimoto not only confronted groups of power, he did the same with bureaucracy,
corporations, banking complex and conventional political parties. Hashimoto
soon caught the citizenship’s attention, for the first time in many years Ōsaka
citizens felt there was a link between them and politicians. Conventional
political mechanisms changed, Hashimoto Tōru was close to the people and this
resulted in direct support of the latter. Accordingly, Tōru implemented public
opinion and social support as a weapon to confront anyone who opposed his
reforms. Hashimoto extrapolated media practices to the political world. Over
time he capitalized an enormous quantity of power, making the transfer to
national scenario much faster than other local politicians. Despite this he
understood that it was also necessary a political structure, hence Nippon Ishin
no Kai, a political party with great support during the 2012 elections emerged.
Perhaps the period of political change favored him, rather than evidencing an
taking advantage of it (something that cannot explain for instance how his
party did not count with an official candidate for Kantei). Inexperience added
to Jimintō’s imminent comeback meant that Nippon Ishin no Kai lost the chance,
however we might ask ourselves how well prepared was the party? Despite it,
Kansai’s young promise gave hope to millions of Japanese.
Hashimoto Tōru during his historical visit to the Foreign Correspondents' Club of Japan. Despite he was expected to publicly apologize due to previous statements on historical issues Hashimoto evaded responsibility and left many dissatisfied.
Political
setbacks and mistakes also affected his career. The unfortunate statements
comprising Japan’s past meant a turning point in Hashimoto’s career, even more
than the failed attempt to form an alliance with Watanabe-san from Minna no Tō.
For this young politician, brand-new Ōsaka Shichō, this moment would alter the
order of events. Hashimoto counted, after governing Ōsaka prefecture and city,
with possibilities to land one day at Kantei and achieving the idealization of change
he once sought. Of course his future is supported around Ōsaka, however he
could have performed alliances with other relevant centers of power, even with
the repeatedly mentioned in this work establishment. All this did not appear
to be interesting for Hashimoto, who went the solo-way. His attitude lacked
consensus, leading Tōru to strengthen power around his manor, like an old time Daimyō. Following this line, to which ‘Lord’ does Hashimoto pay tribute? This
was the key point in the discussion over Hashimoto’s political future. By not
being part of the Japanese traditional structure nor any faction, neither
having a political ‘father’ who could guide him, most people claim that Tōru is
a momentum, rather than a long standing structure. Despite Hashimoto declared
he did not have the intention of becoming Prime Minister, he could have created
the conditions in order to generate it. This position contrast with the one
most political analysts have, which claims that Tōru is just a local political
figure with no real chances of becoming part of the structure that governs the
nation. Both positions are valid and at the same time enrich the debate towards
this political figure. For the time being it is clear that Hashimoto has a long
way to go, or perhaps we should say a long flight to be performed by the Ōsaka
Dragon. For many, Hashimoto has buried his political career, for other this is
how his life has always been: radical, confrontational and alterative. So far,
his personal plans appear to be in an impasse, however this does not mean he
cannot reverse the complex situation in which he has gotten himself.
Hashimoto Tōru
is all described here and even more. Undoubtedly he is one of the most
interesting political figures that emerged in Japan during recent years.
Perhaps we should wait before making any accurate verdict regarding his
political future, however there is no doubt that his remarkable career allows
us to approach and understand in a better way the renowned Ōsaka Dragon.
Tomás Vera Ziccardi.
* This work is physical and intellectual property of Mr. Tomás Vera Ziccardi. The rights of this work are reserved to TVZC® by express request of the Author.
