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The Ōsaka Dragon.

The Ōsaka Dragon.

Author: Tomás Vera Ziccardi.

Triumphant or defeated? With political expectations or a finished carrier? Popular or hated by society? These and many more questions surround one of the most dynamic political figures that the rigid Japanese system has known in recent years. For many Japanese voters Hashimoto Tōru represents a new generation of politicians. Non identified or linked with the traditional Japanese elite that has commanded national politics, critic of Tōkyō’s bureaucracy and proclaimed as one of the potential leaders that could confront Kantō’s power, Mr. Hashimoto has awakened since the very beginning the support of a relevant sector of Japanese citizenship. Despite this, not only the academic and the political – economic elites from Tokyo have shown resistance to his proposals, he has also obtained opposition from voters of large urban conglomerates. Of course most of this is linked to the increasing media exposure that the current Ōsaka Major has had, especially after his statement regarding ‘comfort women’ and Japan’s Imperial past. Despite the dyad in which Mr. Hashimoto has settled himself, his political figure has expanded to a national scale. What will the future hold for this young politician? Unfortunately we do not have the answer to this question, but it is clear that in order to understand his future we need to address his personal life, political career and the stellar evolution that allowed him to go from a prefectural political figure to a nationwide one.   

Despite he was born in Tōkyō (where he spent his early years), Mr. Hashimoto soon abandoned the Kantō region, due to family reasons, and settled himself in Kansai. His family background is extremely complex. Hashimoto had to go through economic and personal difficulties during his youth. Despite it he did not faltered in his personal goal of becoming a lawyer. For this purpose, once completed elementary school he returned to Kantō in order to enter Law School at Waseda University. After some attempts Hashimoto managed to enter one of the most prestigious universities in Japan, where he would graduate at age 25. Firstly there is something that should be clear, Hashimoto did not show immediate interest in politics during his days as a college student. Unlike thousands of Japanese freshmen that enter top universities in Tōkyō with the desire of becoming relevant political figures, Hashimoto ended up being a distant prototype to the Japanese student interested in politics. On the other hand, it should be clear that Hashimoto’s background was not the one from a wealthy Japanese family, hence Tōru shall not be confused with a member of the traditional Japanese elite, something that clearly differentiates him from other Japanese politicians.

After completing his studies Hashimoto began to develop his career as a lawyer. During these years he managed to progress, especially within the firm he founded. His professional performance mainly covered the area of corporate law.

Hashimoto Tōru is one of the most interesting Japanese political figures. His arrival to national politics differs from the traditional way, something that made especialists categorize him as an 'outsider'. 

Despite what was previously exposed, Hashimoto Tōru began to relate himself with the world of television entertainment. His corporate connections allowed him to perform breaf appearances on television, mostly expressing himself about legal issues. Over the years Mr. Hashimoto was able to increase his popularity, becoming part of popular programs where he did not only speak about law and respond to inquiries from the audience, now Hashimoto began expressing political ideas. Possibly the main characteristic Hashimoto exposed during his years on TV was the simplicity with which he responded to political issues. In a society where the political establishment tends to scarcely debate and offer few answers to the people’s inquiries, the voice of a young critic aroused relevant levels of affection from the audience. This allowed Hashimoto to expand his popularity even farther, becoming an important personality for civil society. It would be precisely during these years when the possibility of a direct involvement in politics began to take shape. Even more, several political parties thought about the possibility of capitalizing Hashimoto’s popularity. Despite rumors Hashimoto continued his link with local media. Finishing with the approach developed so far, we can evidence that Hashimoto Tōru increased his popularity nationwide, while retaining his legal performance. One of the main achievements of Ōsaka's future Major would be the one of combining both worlds, creating a quick response for various sectors of Japanese society.

His image gave him the opportunity of becoming an important social actor. His popularity continued growing, especially in the Ōsaka City. During 2006 and 2007 Hashimoto increased his speech related to social and political issues, becoming severely critical of the way things were administered in Ōsaka Prefecture.

At first Mr. Hashimoto denied rumors regarding his interest of becoming candidate for the Ōsaka governance. We should take into account that back at that time Hashimoto lacked experience as a public service official. He had never served at any level of the Japanese public service. While the establishment reinforced its critics regarding this issue, civil society seemed not to care about it. Meanwhile we should understand that Ōsaka elections were a watershed moment for one of Japan’s most important prefectures. Ōta Fusae, bureaucrat with an unimpeachable experience as public service officer, had governed Ōsaka for 8 years. After being re-elected for a second term, a political change was clearly visible. Hashimoto acknowledged the opportunity, at the same time he started to receive support from Jimintō and Kōmeitō. It is clear that in order to land at such an important political position, being a popular figure was not enough, Tōru would need support from Japan’s biggest political machinery.

After weeks of speculation and even when Mrs. Ōta had announced her departure from the prefectural executive, Mr. Hashimoto, with just a few months of time before the election, announced his candidacy. The political victory gave Hashimoto more than 51% of votes, becoming by early 2008 the Governor of Ōsaka Prefecture. His victory was celebrated by locals and certain political structures, it was local bureaucracy which showed a massive rejection of the new Governor. This might have been linked to Hashimoto’s statements which announced huge cuts in public spending and the number of administrative personnel. As we can appreciate, the relationship between the young political leader and bureaucracy opened a new chapter that would end up conditioning both parties.

Ōsaka is one of Japan’s most important political and financial centers of power. In 2008 Hashimoto won the election for Governor of Ōsaka Prefecture.

During his first years as Governor, Tōru decided to tackle one of Ōsaka’s main issues, its debt. The prefecture had one of Japan’s highest debts. Hashimoto began with a series of measures focused on reducing both debt and public spending. This led to direct confrontation with concentrated groups of power, especially those of the banking sector and public administration. Here we evidence one of the tools that Mr. Hashimoto will use throughout his political career, resorting to media exposure in order to obtain people’s support and thus being able to confront these powerful sectors that opposed his reforms. Hashimoto managed to counter political inexperience with his media popularity.

Perhaps we should stop at a relevant issue. The radical position Hashimoto showed from a very beginning did nothing else that increase his popularity. In a nation where a vast majority of the politicians are linked to corporations and the economic power, a figure like Hashimoto, who not only fought them if not also exposed his fight to people, ended up positioning him as someone different. Hashimoto’s popularity during his first two years of government reached figures close to 70% and 80%.

Undoubtedly Hashimoto strengthened his power, increased his popularity and managed to advance in his reforms. Possibly, one of the most important stages of his government was reached in 2010, when along with other relevant Ōsaka figures founded his political party Ōsaka Ishin no Kai, known in the West under the name of Ōsaka Restoration Association / Party. We clearly evidence Mr. Hashimoto’s institutionalization of the power achieved during the past years. Now it would no longer be necessary to request support from the major political parties, Tōru counted with his own political platform which would allow him to control Ōsaka. This is complemented with the interest Hashimoto exposed from the very beginning of unifying Ōsaka Prefecture with certain areas of Ōsaka City, in order to create a metropolitan area in Ōsaka, similar to the one in Tōkyō. This plan is extremely interesting, it introduces innovative issues and possible political & administrative changes for the Kansai Region, however it should also be considered that it hides Hashimoto’s personal interest of strengthening his power in Kansai, while consolidating his party and allies. Tōru made it clear by the end of 2011, when he resigned as Governor in order to compete for the elections of Ōsaka City. Tōru would not simply leave the prefectural government, Matsui Ichirō, who in 2010 was appointed as Secretary General of Ōsaka Ishin no Kai, would run for the governorship. As we can see Hashimoto placed one of his main political allies as candidate for Ōsaka prefectural government and ran as candidate for Ōsaka Major. As expected, both Hashimoto and Matsui were victorious, enabling Ōsaka Restoration Party to control Ōsaka City and Ōsaka Prefecture.

As incumbent Ōsaka Governor Mr. Hashimoto introduced reforms focused on tackling the Prefecture’s debt. His confrontative attitude gave him the support of a vast majority of citizens, something that explains early popularity levels.

At this point Hashimoto’s plan marched as previously stipulated. He now controlled the two most important centers of power at the local level. On the other hand he counted with a political party which desired to expand nationwide. As for the elections, Ōsaka Ishin no Kai reached a simple majority in the prefectural assembly, despite over time it would be difficult to retain seats in the city assembly where the party would suffer several setbacks and desertions. Despite this situation, electoral results during the first years were extremely favorable to Hashimoto and his party.

The year 2012 was one of major political changes in Japan. The political forces restructuration after Minshutō’s inevitable departure from government made it clear that a new opportunity loomed on the horizon for many parties and political leaders. Clearly, Hashimoto Tōru had already made the passage to national scene, his popularity had surpassed Osaka’s frontiers. The difference was that he now needed not only to begin with the allies recruiting but also to constitute a nationwide party. This is how during 2012 he founded Nippon Ishin no Kai, the national extension of Ōsaka’s ruling party. His interest in expanding his influence to Tōkyō was clearly represented in this political move. Hashimoto not only counted with an enormous popularity due to his past, now he had experience in management while he also showed toughness to carry out the policies he believed were the best at that time. Furthermore Hashimoto represented a new generation of young politicians, distant (to some extent) to the traditional Japanese political elite. This young Japanese leader also represented a change in the centers of political power. A figure from Ōsaka reached national popularity, challenging Tōkyō’s establishment. For many Japanese voters Hashimoto was an important change in political terms, possibly one of those that had ever taken place before.

Hashimoto clearly awakened interest from various political sectors. After being elected as Ōsaka Mayor he conducted meetings with various political forces and party leaders from Tōkyō. Initially people linked him with Jimintō, Your Party and even Kōmeitō. His connections with other relevant leaders such as Abe, Watanabe and Ishihara proved that Hashimoto was prepared to interact at the highest level of Japanese politics. Despite his growing popularity, misunderstandings were about to interfere between Hashimoto and prominent political figures. As Nippon Ishin no Kai gained strength at the national level, Hashimoto’s position took distance from the one of moderate sectors among Jimintō and Minshutō. Tōru himself began to focus on his plan of creating and Ōsaka Metropolitan Area. The idea was highly innovative, it desired to develop a system similar to the one of Tōkyō-to, but applied to the Kansai region. This project was ideologically linked to Hashimoto’s personal ideas, those of independence, autonomy and self-sufficiency. For others, Hashimoto’s plan hid a political framework with a view to alienate Ōsaka from national administration. Cutting ties with Tōkyō and establishing itself as an autonomous center of power was what many analysts perceived from this plan. Several scholars went further and mentioned that Hashimoto’s idea was to create an ‘independent enclave in Kansai’ and the ‘Republic of Kansai’, from which he would base a national platform in order to become in the future the Prime Minister of Japan. As you might appreciate, political positions were extremely divergent. The plan itself consisted of unifying certain sectors of the Ōsaka Prefecture, Ōsaka City and the Municipality of Sakai, in order to establish an independent metropolitan region, similar to that of Tōkyō. Initially the plan was to establish between 10 and 15 special wards like those of Chiyoda-ku, Minato-ku and Taitō-ku in Tōkyō. Let’s recall that both governments were now under control of the same political party. In Sakai, Nippon Ishin no Kai won a majority in the municipal assembly. This made it evident that the possibilities of achieving the project were factual. Lastly, it is important to explain that despite having elections in each ward the responsibility for security, economic, employment and public service issues would be shared between the local authorities and the metropolitan government.

During his exercise of power Hashimoto Tōru had to battle concentrated groups of power, among which were the financial and banking sectors.

As previously mentioned, the Ōsaka Metropolis project affected and altered the relation between Hashimoto and major political parties at local and national levels. Several political forces opposed to the metropolitan plan arguing that it would allow Hashimoto’s party to triumph indefinitely in future elections. Most of these parties feared that Nippon Ishin no Kai would establish in Ōsaka and autonomous centre of power, impossible to electorally defeat. Local leaders, by observing the election results at the prefectural, city and municipal (including Sakai) levels, understood that it would be difficult to fight against Hashimoto’s project, while on the other hand cooperation would mean breaking the guidelines with their party headquarters in Tōkyō.

Despite the opposing positions on the political scene, main criticism to Tōru’s plan emerged from the press. This would continue delimiting the fissure between Hashimoto and the press.

The alliance between Hashimoto and Ishihara focuses on expanding the political platform of Ōsaka Ishin no Kai by linking Tōkyo and Ōsaka. The party leaders have been their respective governors. 

Prior to the Ōsaka City elections, when rumors regarding Hashimoto’s early resignation began to emerge, Japan Daily Press published an article where focusing on the Ōsaka Governor’s metropolitan plan argued that Hashimoto would resign and run as a candidate for the upcoming city elections, overcoming the final obstacles for achieving his project. National press, specially that one focused on international readers, including Japan Daily Press, Japan Times and The Asahi Shimbun (including Asia and Japan Watch) always had a troubled relation with Hashimoto. In fact it was due to media that criticism gained national force, in a sense warning Japanese citizens that it was all part of a Machiavellian plan that would allow Hashimoto to perpetuate himself and his party in government. After the victory in Ōsaka City, last March, the media sought to reinforce the idea that less that 30% of the electorate actually took part in the elections, challenging the insistence with which Hashimoto sought to increase his influence in the legislature in order to push forward his metropolitan plan. Of course, the relationship further deteriorated when Hashimoto made inopportune declarations regarding ‘Comfort Women’, which marked the formal war declaration between Hashimoto and the most liberal sector of Japanese press. As The Japan Times stated in an article published last February and titled Final Season for Toru Hashimoto Show?, Hashimoto’s plan for unifying the city and prefecture in order to create a metropolitan area had little support in the respective assemblies, hence the resignation tactic was something that not even his supporters understood (especially when Hashimoto should have stayed in his position until 2015). As for the press, Hashimoto’s insistence on having the plan finished and approved by April 2014, proved the impossibility of carrying it out by his own. In a sense this is due to the forces positioning inside the assemblies configuration, which must approve the project before a referendum is called, but it should also be taken into consideration that the project had the deliberation of consolidating an independent bureaucracy in Ōsaka, reducing political and administrative opposition in the Prefecture and City of Ōsaka. The article goes even further, stating that Hashimoto’s idea is the one of establishing and independent and autonomous ‘Republic of Kansai’.

In order to expand nationwide Hashimoto created Nippon Ishin no Kai, the extension of Ōsaka’s platform. His political movements approached him to former Tōkyō Governor Mr. Ishihara Shintaro. In the image you can appreciate both leaders during a campaign event.

Possibly most of the accusations made from the press were valid, however for the last elections in Ōsaka other factors were relevant. For instance we must take into account Kōmeitō’s position, which back then was Hashimoto’s major local ally. Their representatives opposed to the project, generating even more opposition in the local assembly. For Hashimoto this was a huge setback. His personal project counted with the opposition from national media, left wing sectors, civil society organizations and major political parties. On the other hand, Matsui, also linked with Jimintō and Tōkyō politicians, sought to minimize the so called ‘Komeitō Effect’. In order to achieve his goal Hashimoto must have electoral success and support from the citizenship. For us an extra element is also important, Tōru must have Tokyo’s approval, specially an unconditional support from the bureaucrats and the national government.

We should take into account electoral results. In the last general election to the Lower House of Kokkai, Nippon Ishin no Kai obtained 54 seats, making it the third political force in the House of Representatives. Let’s consider that its performance was close to Minshutō’s one (57 seats) and surpassed Komeitō’s one, a party which usually gets close to 31 seats. This shows that Nippon Ishin no Kai managed to establish itself in the Japanese Diet, nevertheless if it desires to increase its popularity it should expand at a national scale (especially in the vast majority of prefectures). Its main political figures, Ishihara Shintaro and Hashimoto Tōru, are not enough in order to win a national election on their own. The party lacks from an expanded and nationwide consolidated structure like the one for instance Jimintō has. Even for political parties that reached national government such as Minshutō it has been extremely difficult to retain local allies in different cities and prefectures, hence Hashimoto should reconsider his strategy of unifying the city and prefecture until he manages to obtain political and bureaucratic support. The creation of the institute for young leaders proves that Tōru wills to consolidate his power in Kansai, many youths who have been exponents of the electoral support Ōsaka’s Major obtained wish to be part of this ‘new bureaucracy’ that is intended to control the future Ōsaka Metropolitan Area. In order to achieve these objectives Hashimoto must have the political, economic, financial and media support from the sectors with which he has had a fruitful relation. It would have been feasible to achieve the completion of his plan by this year if Mr. Hashimoto had spent time working from the shadows and distant from the enormous public exposure he lately had. Accurately as The Japan Times titled, the ‘Hashimoto Show’ worked against Tōru, despite being an expert as to media exposure and debate. Tōru has failed to understand that in Japan the work ‘from behind’ facilitates the achievement of personal goals, instead he decided to apply radical reforms by entering a media clash against consolidated groups of power. On television that gave him results, in national politics new strategies should be adopted, that has been Hashimoto’s greatest failure: believing he could go against the system by using tools the own system created. Tōru did not notice that cooperation, negotiation and ‘backdoors’ arrangements are better strategies in order to fulfill his political desires. This is where it becomes clear that Hashimoto Tōru is not the future successor of an historical political figure such as Ozawa Ichirō. In recent years many political analysts claimed that Mr. Hashimoto was 'Japan’s New Shōgun', who would occupy the spot left by ‘Shadow Shōgun’. However this is not going to happen. On the first place Ozawa raised as a political figure from the core of the political system, emerging from Jimintō and establishing himself as a relevant member of the Tanaka Faction. He knows the mechanisms by which a figure can obtain political advantages, in fact being able to operate in the backdoors of politics rather that applying for public confrontation allowed him to gain support for his initiatives at the same time it gave him the appellation of Shadow Shogun. Hashimoto never understood this, not only for being an outsider but also because he keeps applying tactics in a world that works under a different logic from TV. We could never proclaim Hashimoto as a Shōgun, because he lacks the ability to negotiate with rivals and enemies. Tōru believes that the only way by which one can succeed is through a state of constant war. A wise Shōgun was the one able to settle down and negotiate, instead Hashimoto believes that the way in which he will obtain his objectives is by relying on his own power and not opening the channel for dialogue. This does not work in a nation like Japan. Kansai’s leader is far from emulating the feudal lords that once ruled Japan, but he is even farther from surpassing ‘The Last Shōgun of Japan’, Mr. Ozawa. Hashimoto’s combative stance reminds us of a dragon, which believes that fighting alone against everyone else is the only way. Hashimoto is a dragon who thinks that by strengthening his nest in Ōsaka he would be able to confront Tōkyō’s power. Unfortunately for him, Hashimoto did not understand that in Japan you cannot fight independently against the establishment.

Bureaucracy and media have been among Hashimoto’s major opponents. His level of cooperation with them was almost non-existent. 

Over the past years The Economist has paid enormous attention to the political and economic situation in Japan. The prestigious British media has addressed in a coherent way the vast majority of political changes that took part in Japan since the Koizumi years onwards. Hence it is interesting to pay attention to one of its most recent publications titled ‘Flaming out: the decline of Toru Hashimoto’. In this work Hashimoto is introduced as a right-wing leader with a conservative vision of some mainstream issues while in others he has introduced innovative proposals. For The Economist, the electoral analysis based on what were the elections for Ōsaka City (eventually won by Hashimoto) yielded a secured victory for the former Ōsaka Governor. In fact their approach focused on pointing out the lack of serious opposition leaders able to counter the growing image of young Hashimoto. However, for us it is relevant the ideas exposed by The Economist regarding Hashimoto’s Metropolitan plan. According to the British newspapers Hashimoto faces three serious problems in order to achieve his master plan. Firstly the political, media and electoral setbacks that his figured suffered, impacted negatively on the project. This is effectively true, if Hashimoto had maintained a moderate profile during national elections and at the same time avoided entering ideological and historical cleavages he would have not only improved Nippon Ishin no Kai’s electoral performance but also obtained the local and national support for his project. On the second place, Hashimoto’s second major drawback, according to The Economist, was that he never designed a strategy in order to introduce it to civil society, specifically to the citizens of Sakai & Ōsaka city and prefecture. Several Kansai citizens repeatedly asked themselves ‘what benefits does this plan bring for us?’ Beyond Hashimoto’s justification of reducing public spending, bureaucratic centralization and improvements in decision making, the metropolitan project does not position citizens as the main priority, hence it literally ended up looking as a personal plan of Mr. Hashimoto. Over time many have been the members of society that began opposing to Hashimoto’s plan, precisely because he failed in this issue, providing benefits to the citizenship. Finally, the third pillar the prevents the reform is local opposition. After the election that benefited Sakai’s Major (key town for Nippon Ishin no Kai’s project), Takeyama Osami, local resistance from the political apparatus increased. The possibilities of negotiation with Hashimoto became remote, now local leaders think it should be Tōru who approaches them in order to initiate negotiations.

 Finally the article, as its heading points out, suggests a possible scenario/panorama for Hashimoto Tōru, the end of his political career, his disappearance from the national arena. Part of this, The Economist explains, is because the Shinzō Abe Administration ended up hogging Hashimoto’s ideological spectrum. This added to the political and discursive mistakes impacted on the vision that society has of him. In addition to this factors a third one is added, which is the project for the metropolitan area. If Hashimoto fails to achieve his plan, as The Economist argues, he would destroy his major aspiration, ending up in a locked position with no way out. This approach is extremely interesting, although it may be refuted. Hashimoto did not center his political career on Ōsaka’s Metropolitan Project, he sought to expand his influence to other regions, represented on the alliance with conservative politician Ishihara Shintaro. Tōru also moved a step forward by becoming a national figure. Yes, it is true that the shift to the right (partly generated by the society and partly by the current ruling party) is notorious and that Hashimoto risks losing political ‘capital’, but he still counts with a key centre of power such as Ōsaka. It is hard to imagine Ōsaka without Tōru, as in accordance with The Economist, there are no major political figures that can overtake him. So far if there is something irrefutable is what The Economist points out: Hashimoto’s public exposure and statements could definitely push him to a forced exile from politics. However this deserves a separate review.

One of Hashimoto’s main projects has been the creation of the so called Ōsaka Metropolitan Area. This innovative proposal has both supporters and detractors. 

In recent years Japanese society has experienced an increase in the ideological cleavage linked to nationalist, historical and political issues. This has not been expressed in higher levels of social conflict, but rather a revival of extremist positions, many of which are linked to Japan’s historical legacy. This is how, for example, the famous ‘Hate Speech’ overstocked national scene, when different sectors of Japanese society (from right-wing groups to ordinary citizens) took over Tōkyō streets in order to protests against Korean immigrants, more precisely in Shin Ōkubo. Moreover, from the political power there has been an increase in the degree of interference in historical issues. What political analysts expressed some years ago, Japan’s shift to the right, appears to start taking shape. Part of the changes in power also expressed themselves in the emergence of new right-wing leaders, among which we could include Mr. Hashimoto. As we saw at the beginning of the work, Tōru has always been a controversial leader who has repeatedly expressed positions that address issues of Japan’s recent history. It was precisely during 2013 that he stated ‘comfort women’ were necessary. Despite some months before that, declarations from the political establishment towards the relation with China and Korea increased their complexity, Hashimoto’s words surprised everyone, not only because of their proximity to elections but also because this time Hashimoto got involved in an extremely complex issue that transcends the position of any political leader. Rapidly both, sectors of the Japanese and Korean society expressed rejection towards the words of Ōsaka’s leader. Japanese politicians themselves opposed to Hashimoto’s words, and those who did not do so decided to remain silent in order of not getting involved in what might be one of the greatest political gaffs of Japan’s recent political history. Despite this, it was the press who attacked more fiercely, especially its more liberal wing. Not only Japanese media, the foreign one exposed the leader’s words and the opposition erected against him. Hashimoto quickly increased his national presence, unfortunately not the way he expected. Tōru had to repeatedly express himself regarding his previous statement, his contradictory declarations made it look like if every time he spoke things got worse. Hashimoto ended up seeing how the world from which he eventually was part (the media) turned against him. Tōru faced most of his historical enemies, now allied to main media accredited in Tōkyō. Hashimoto ended up seeking for a way out that would do little in order to amend his mistake, when he visited the prestigious Foreign Correspondents' Club of Japan in what was a full session of about two hours trying to explain his words rather than apologizing. Instead of clarifying he constantly shifted the focus of attention by evading key questions and trying to get as far away from his previous statements. Briefly, Hashimoto, a prominent politician who had everything ahead, with a few weeks for elections to Kokkai, destroyed most of his political capital by making statements on a controversial issue. Of course everyone knew from the very beginning that Tōru would not retract his words, having the possibility in front of the media that day at the FCCJ he did not do it, missing the opportunity and worsening the view that much of the society had of him.

Party event of Nippon Ishin no Kai at its headquarters in Ōsaka after the positive national election of 2012.

The emergence of Hashimoto Tōru in Japan’s political life meant a notorious change that rose enthusiasm among many sectors of Japanese society. Despite being an outsider Hashimoto counted with social support, his proposals, framed in an agenda of structural reforms not only of public policy but also in the way of making politics, delighted a vast majority of Ōsaka’s electorate. Since his early appearances on TV he introduced a radical view of how things should work, over the years he secured a place in a complex environment like the one of Japanese media. Despite not counting with the family background, the specific formation and the contacts that members of the political – economic establishment generally have, Hashimoto landed in the arena of politics throughout television. Despite being an exception rather than the rule, Tōru managed to position himself as a different candidate. In this way he challenged the entire Japanese elite when he became Ōsaka Governor. His policies once in power certified his promises and ideological line. Hashimoto not only confronted groups of power, he did the same with bureaucracy, corporations, banking complex and conventional political parties. Hashimoto soon caught the citizenship’s attention, for the first time in many years Ōsaka citizens felt there was a link between them and politicians. Conventional political mechanisms changed, Hashimoto Tōru was close to the people and this resulted in direct support of the latter. Accordingly, Tōru implemented public opinion and social support as a weapon to confront anyone who opposed his reforms. Hashimoto extrapolated media practices to the political world. Over time he capitalized an enormous quantity of power, making the transfer to national scenario much faster than other local politicians. Despite this he understood that it was also necessary a political structure, hence Nippon Ishin no Kai, a political party with great support during the 2012 elections emerged. Perhaps the period of political change favored him, rather than evidencing an taking advantage of it (something that cannot explain for instance how his party did not count with an official candidate for Kantei). Inexperience added to Jimintō’s imminent comeback meant that Nippon Ishin no Kai lost the chance, however we might ask ourselves how well prepared was the party? Despite it, Kansai’s young promise gave hope to millions of Japanese.

Hashimoto Tōru during his historical visit to the Foreign Correspondents' Club of Japan. Despite he was expected to publicly apologize due to previous statements on historical issues Hashimoto evaded responsibility and left many dissatisfied. 

Political setbacks and mistakes also affected his career. The unfortunate statements comprising Japan’s past meant a turning point in Hashimoto’s career, even more than the failed attempt to form an alliance with Watanabe-san from Minna no Tō. For this young politician, brand-new Ōsaka Shichō, this moment would alter the order of events. Hashimoto counted, after governing Ōsaka prefecture and city, with possibilities to land one day at Kantei and achieving the idealization of change he once sought. Of course his future is supported around Ōsaka, however he could have performed alliances with other relevant centers of power, even with the repeatedly mentioned in this work establishment. All this did not appear to be interesting for Hashimoto, who went the solo-way. His attitude lacked consensus, leading Tōru to strengthen power around his manor, like an old time Daimyō. Following this line, to which ‘Lord’ does Hashimoto pay tribute? This was the key point in the discussion over Hashimoto’s political future. By not being part of the Japanese traditional structure nor any faction, neither having a political ‘father’ who could guide him, most people claim that Tōru is a momentum, rather than a long standing structure. Despite Hashimoto declared he did not have the intention of becoming Prime Minister, he could have created the conditions in order to generate it. This position contrast with the one most political analysts have, which claims that Tōru is just a local political figure with no real chances of becoming part of the structure that governs the nation. Both positions are valid and at the same time enrich the debate towards this political figure. For the time being it is clear that Hashimoto has a long way to go, or perhaps we should say a long flight to be performed by the Ōsaka Dragon. For many, Hashimoto has buried his political career, for other this is how his life has always been: radical, confrontational and alterative. So far, his personal plans appear to be in an impasse, however this does not mean he cannot reverse the complex situation in which he has gotten himself.

Hashimoto Tōru is all described here and even more. Undoubtedly he is one of the most interesting political figures that emerged in Japan during recent years. Perhaps we should wait before making any accurate verdict regarding his political future, however there is no doubt that his remarkable career allows us to approach and understand in a better way the renowned Ōsaka Dragon.

                                                                                                  Tomás Vera Ziccardi.

* This work is physical and intellectual property of Mr. Tomás Vera Ziccardi. The rights of this work are reserved to TVZC® by express request of the Author.